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1. Introduction 
Demographic change, growing urbanization, intensification of agriculture and climate 
change all pose a continual challenge to the availability of water resources. The increasing 
competition for water demand among the sectors of human activities and for the 
environment requires the development of policies for water resources sustainability.  
Policies to expand water resource supplies are currently not in vogue because they involve 
the   regulation of water through physical impediments such as the construction of dams, 
weirs and channels. Over the last few decades demand management policies involving 
water pricing, assigning water rights and introducing water markets have received 
increased emphasis. Water rights, a prerequisite for water markets, are considered as a key 
water management instrument to improve water use efficiency. 
In response to concerns of increasing water scarcity and seriously degraded river 
ecosystems, water policy in China over recent decades has shifted from investing in large 
storage and delivery infrastructure to policies and institutions designed to allocate the 
existing resource more efficiently. The definition and establishment of water rights 
allocation systems are important components of water management reform. Water rights 
allocation systems did not exist in China before 1988. The 1988 Water Law and its revision, 
the 2002 Water Law, have introduced initial water rights allocation across the country. In 
China, water rights are defined by the state according to the priorities assigned to competing 
users. Water resources in a trans-provincial (or prefectural) basin are shared amongst the 
jurisdictions administratively. 
Northwestern China faces more severe water shortages for its arid climate. The agriculture 
water use is above 80% of total water use in this region. Therefore, agriculture water rights 
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reform raises much concern currently. In some areas, the water rights defined for province 
or prefecture are allocated further to the irrigation districts and farmers. Then, the water 
trading happens in these places. For example, Hangjin Irrigation District on the south bank 
of the Yellow River, Inner Mongolia has traded some of its irrigation water to downstream 
factories. The trading is termed “irrigation water-saving supported by industrial 
investment, with saved water traded to industry”. At the same time, Hangjin Irrigation 
District has conducted a comprehensive reform of irrigation water management focused on 
water rights.  
This proposed chapter aims at introducing a framework for water rights allocation, 
management and trading in the farmers’ lever, in order to address: (1) how the long-term 
water rights can be defined for the individual farmers in order to share the total water 
resource of the irrigation district; (2) how the farmers’ water rights are administrated, 
monitored and accounted; (3) how the farmers to trade their water rights with the industry 
users or other farmers in the context of current Chinese Water Law. 
The chapter will describe the current status of water management in the Hangjin district, 
outlines some of the problems water trading has produced, and presents a framework for 
further water rights reform focused on rights allocation, the granting of volumetrically-
capped water certificates and tickets, water use planning and monitoring, and the 
responsibilities of water user associations in ensuring that individual farmers receive fair 
allocations. In additional, a water trading approach based on “water extraction period 
exchange” in Taolai irrigation distract, Gansu, China will be discussed in the chapter. The 
chapter then summarizes key recommendations of relevance to Hangjin and Taolai and 
other irrigation districts in China. 
2. Water rights allocation among the farmers 
2.1 Introduction 
The Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region in China enjoys exceptional advantages. In 
particular, the region has an abundance of natural resources for the development of mining, 
electric power, metallurgy, chemical, and machinery processing industries. The Region 
plans to use these resources to build a large energy base in the "golden triangle" of Hohhot, 
Baotou and Ordos (Figure 2.1) to create an affluent society. However, the serious shortage of 
water resources hinders the development of the regional energy industry, and the region’s 
allocation of water from the Yellow River Conservancy Commission (YRCC) is already fully 
committed. It is under such circumstances that that the autonomous region initiated a pilot 
program involving the transfer of water rights. Since 2003, a number of pilot projects for 
water right transfer have been launched by the YRCC and the Inner Mongolia Department 
of Water Resources (Shen et al. 2006), aimed at meeting the growing water needs of 
downstream industrial users. 
One of the first such pilots has involved Hangjin Irrigation District. Beginning in 2004, the 
newly established Office of Water Rights and Transfer in Ordos city has overseen a program 
in which water saved through canal lining in the district is transferred to downstream 
industries, with the costs of lining met directly by the industrial beneficiaries. According to 
the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Water Rights Transfer Planning Report, in the 
three-year period from 2005 to 2007, 13 enterprises invested a total of RMB 600 million in 
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canal lining. According to the plan, the implementation of the project will save as much as 
138 million m3 of water. Industrial users funding the capital costs of canal lining are also 
obliged to meet the ongoing operations and maintenance costs of canal repair over a 25 year 
term. 
The channel lining and water transfer program in Hangjin highlights one response to a 
wider problem in China – the problem of increasing scarcity and growing competition for 
water between uses and users. In this context, agriculture is under growing pressure to 
release water to urban and industrial users. Clear rules are needed for doing this and, 
increasingly, clear rights will be needed within irrigation districts (IDs) so that farmers can 
be confident about how much water they will get, and when they will get it. Moreover, a 
system of clearly defined, secure water rights provides the foundation for many other 
reforms aimed at managing demand and increasing efficiency, including water pricing and 
water trading. 
Ordos
HangJin
Baotou
Hohot
Capital
City
Yellow River
Irrigation District
 
Fig. 2.1 Map of Inner Mongolia showing the Yellow River, major cities and Hangjin ID   
2.2 Hangjin irrigation district 
Hangjin County is located to the northwest of Ordos City in Inner Mongolia (Figure 2.1).  
Along its northern margin the Yellow River winds down with a length of roughly 253 km, 
making Hangjin County the longest flowing section of Yellow River of all counties 
nationwide. The county includes nearly 40,000 ha of designated farmland along the Yellow 
River, and is one of three major irrigation zones of Inner Mongolia. It is also one of China’s 
main grain producing areas. Hangjin Gravity Irrigation District (HID) in Hangjin County – 
the focus of this study – is the only irrigation district in Ordos with the right to take water 
from the Yellow River. HID is located on the south bank of the Yellow River and covers an 
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area of approximately 23,000 ha. Of this, roughly 21,000 ha is gravity fed and 1700 ha is 
pumped (at the head of the system).  
Hangjin Irrigation District draws all of its water from the Yellow River. Its water use is 
therefore controlled, ultimately, by the YRCC, which sets minimum flow requirements for 
the river at provincial/regional boundaries based on an Annual Allocation Plan (Table 2.1), 
and allocates relative shares to individual provinces and regions according to supply and 
demand conditions. In a normal year, Inner Mongolia therefore receives 5.86 billion m3 out 
of a total flow of 37 billion m3. The maximum (sometimes termed ‘normal’) gross diversion 
to the Hangjin district –the permitted volume – is 410 million m3 per year, including a 
mandatory return flow of 35 million m3 per year. So, the normal net diversion to HID is 375 
million m3. Return flows are fed back to the river through four main drainage channels. 
Savings of 130 million m3 per year from canal lining, traded out of the irrigation district, will 
leave an ongoing diversion of 280 million m3 per year, illustrated in Figure 2.2. 
 
Province/ 
region 
Qinghai Sichuan Gansu Ningxia 
Inner 
Mongolia
Shaanxi Shanxi Henan Shandong 
Heibei 
& 
Tianjin 
Total 
Annual water 
use 
billion m3 
1.41 0.04 3.04 4 5.86 3.8 4.31 5.54 7 2 37 
% 3.8 0.1 8.2 10.8 15.8 10.3 11.6 15.0 18.9 5.4 100 
Table 2.1 Water allocation in the Yellow River (YRCC, 2005) 
Gross Permit before 
410 million m3 
35 million m3 
Return Flow before 
375 million m3 
Water consumed before 
130 million m3 
Savings after trading 
245 million m3 
Water consumed after 
35 million m3 
Return flow after trading
280 million m3 
Gross diversion after 
 
Fig. 2.2 Diversion, consumption and return flows for Hangjin Irrigation District 
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By 30 September 2006, a total of six canal lining subprojects had been completed, each funded 
by a separate industrial enterprise. The idea of “Industrial Investment in Water Saving for the 
Transfer of Agricultural Water Rights” has helped alleviate the water shortages experienced 
by industry, and has also helped reduce the burden of farmers by saving water and reducing 
farm costs. Currently, the annual water fee for each householder has been reduced by around 
20-30 RMB/year. Farmers’ costs have reduced because they no longer have to pay for water 
losses in the channels that deliver water to the point where water user associations (WUAs) 
make bulk purchases on behalf of the farmers they represent.  
The channel lining and transfer project has had many benefits. However, trading has also 
created a number of problems, particularly for the irrigation agency that is responsible for 
managing and maintaining irrigation infrastructure above WUA purchase points – Hangjin 
Irrigation Management Bureau (HIMB). Moreover, the rights of farmers within the district 
remain ambiguous.  
A framework for a modern system of volumetrically defined water rights in HID has been 
developed (WET, 2007). It is proposed that this serves as a template for guiding reform in 
other IDs in China as competition for water increases, and agricultural users face growing 
pressure to account for their water and release ‘surpluses’ to urban and industrial users. 
The sections below discuss rights definition, allocation and management issues within HID. 
The principal focus is on improving the distribution of water within an ID so that farmers 
receive secure, transparent and equitable allocations within the overall permitted allowance 
of the ID.  
2.3 Long-term Initial water rights allocation 
Drawing on field work conducted in HID, WET (2007) describes how the water diverted to 
the district under its irrigation permit is currently allocated through main and branch 
canals, and down to individual farm households. In common with many IDs in water-scare 
northern China, the allocation process combines bulk volumetric charging to farmer groups 
(increasingly WUAs) established on branch canals, with area-based charging for farmers. 
Water User Associations purchase pre-paid water tickets on behalf of farmers, and are 
responsible for (amongst other things) distributing water within their command areas and 
collecting fees.    
WET describe how water allocation to WUAs could be improved according to the principles 
of fairness, efficiency and environmental sustainability, amplified below. They also describe 
how the water rights of WUAs could be volumetrically defined and capped through the 
issue of Group Water Entitlements (GWEs) at the point at which WUAs pay for bulk 
deliveries. Below this point, farmers would continue to pay for water on an area basis, as 
delivery and monitoring infrastructure in Hangjin, and most IDs in China, is not in place to 
monitor individual entitlements at the household level.   
A volumetric cap on the water rights of WUAs needs to fully consider existing patterns of 
water use within and between WUAs, and the experience of farmers, WUA representatives 
and HIMB staff in administering present systems. Hence it is proposed that rights allocation 
follows existing practice by linking land and water rights. In other words, rights assigned 
would be directly linked to the (existing) irrigated areas of each WUA, and could not be 
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negotiated upwards by a WUA seeking to expand its irrigated area or plant more water-
intensive crops, for example. Hence one objective of defining and enforcing WUA-based 
GWEs would be to end the requirements approach to water use planning that currently 
prevails so that, in future, water savings rather than additional supply would be used to 
maintain or increase farm production and farmer incomes.  
Different regions and different groups of people should enjoy equal rights to water for 
survival and development. Hence the allocation of rights should guarantee fairness between 
different management sections of an ID, different WUAs and different water users and, in 
particular, afford protection to those farmers with small land holdings. In defining and 
allocating rights, consideration should also be given to ‘third party’ impacts on (linked) 
environmental services and other downstream users, such as groundwater users dependent 
on return flows from the irrigation district. How can the GWEs of individual WUAs be 
calculated to account for these factors, and to account for channel losses incurred to the 
points in the system at which WUAs purchase water? WET (2007) describe the calculations 
involved. A water allocation model is used in the water rights allocation process. The 
farmers’ irrigation land area and crop mix are considered in the model (Figure 2.3). 
 
Fig. 2.3 Water allocation model for HID 
The combined irrigated area of all 43 WUAs in the gravity flow section of HID is estimated 
at 21,322 ha. The total volume of water that needs to be delivered to fourth level sluices  
(and therefore WUAs), after subtracting losses in the canals above, is estimated at  
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143 million m3/year. The total volume of water that needs to be diverted from the Yellow 
River to meet WUA requirements and cover conveyance losses is 225 million m3/year. Total 
losses in the canals above fourth level sluices are estimated at 82 million m3/year. Using this 
data, and similar calculations covering allocations to individual WUAs, the long term, initial 
water rights of each WUA in HID can be determined as GWEs. These, in turn, form the basis 
for the issue of water certificates.  
In contrast to the current farmer-driven approach to estimating water needs in ID, such an 
allocation provides a more scientifically-sound basis for defining and capping rights within 
the overall allowance of the irrigation district, and for accounting for all transmission losses 
through main and branch canals to WUAs. Since losses in each canal have now been 
estimated, future conservation efforts – including trading in transmission savings – can be 
better targeted and quantified. In this way, the approach to defining and allocating GWEs 
described above can form the basis for rights reform in other IDs. 
3. Water rights management in an irrigation district 
An integrated framework of irrigation water use in compliance with the farmers’ water 
rights will be proposed in this section for Hangjin irrigation district, including the water use 
monitoring and accounting, accounting the farmers’ water use to ensure that their water 
uses are under the allocation quota and water tickets as well as the role of water users 
association, et al.  
3.1 Water rights certificates and water tickets 
A system of water rights certificates can be used to formalise the rights of WUAs, providing 
information on long-term rights (defined by GWEs), annual water entitlements (defined by 
available supply in any given year) and the water purchased in each irrigation period. In 
addition, the system can provide information on any water transactions that have occurred 
between WUAs, and between WUAs and the irrigation management agency.  Table 3.1 
provides a summary of certificate functions and uses.   
 
Function Use 
Voucher for long 
term rights 
The irrigation management agency records each WUAs long-term water 
rights (GWEs) in a water certificate. 
Calculation of 
purchase limits 
At the beginning of the year, the irrigation management agency 
calculates the water purchase limit (annual entitlement) of each WUA 
and records this information on the certificate. After purchasing tickets 
in each irrigation period, the purchase amount will be recorded on the 
certificate to calculate the remaining purchase limit for the following 
periods. WUAs can purchase tickets up to the limit.  
Record of water 
trading 
The irrigation management agency records all information on water 
transactions. 
Reference for 
water rights 
reallocation 
The irrigation management agency will accumulate data on actual water 
use across seasons and between years, helping to guide any future 
adjustment.  
Table 3.1 Functions and uses of water certificates 
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To establish and operate such a system, the following steps are proposed (WET, 2007): 
• After an initial water rights allocation process, the irrigation agency grants rights to each 
WUA in the form of a water certificate. This will show each WUAs long term water right.   
• At the beginning of each year, the agency calculates the proportional water share that 
each WUA is entitled to (an annual entitlement) based on expected water availability in 
that year.   
• Before each irrigation, the agency adjusts, as necessary, each WUAs annual entitlement 
in light of predicted supply to give a corresponding water purchase limit for all 
remaining irrigation periods. The purchase limit is recorded on each WUAs water 
certificate.  
• After purchasing water tickets in any given irrigation period, the purchase amount is 
recorded on the certificate to calculate the remaining purchase allowance, or 
entitlement, of the WUA for the next period. In other words, a process of continuous 
water accounting is adopted between irrigation periods.   
• Any water trading is recorded by the relevant agency section office on the water 
certificates of both buyer and seller. Trading with other sections is also checked and 
registered with the agency.  Certificates would also show actual water deliveries after 
trading. 
After a reasonable period of operation (5-10 years), the irrigation management agency can 
review certificates in light of actual water use and trading experience, and revise as 
necessary. Following any long term trade of water rights, the irrigation management agency 
can take back old certificates and issue new ones after thorough auditing and recording. 
For each WUAs purchase of water, it is proposed that the current system of pre-payment 
through water tickets is continued. Water tickets provide the basis for water purchase, water 
delivery and water trading within prescribed limits. The ticketing system can ensure that 
both WUAs and the irrigation management agency have clear information on prices, 
deliveries and volumetric rights, allowing WUAs to trade savings freely (Wu & Wu, 1993). 
Water User Associations would buy water tickets according to their water certificates before 
each irrigation, and would also be allowed to purchase extra water from those WUAs 
deciding not to use their full allowance (Feng & Li, 1993). Table 3.2 provides a summary of 
ticket functions and uses.  
 
Function Use 
Support for permit 
control and quota 
management 
WUAs buy tickets up to their caps; HIMB sells tickets according 
to water availability and water rights limits. 
Pre-payment for 
water 
Water is only supplied by HIMB once WUAs have purchased 
tickets. 
Water trading and 
monitoring 
WUAs can buy and sell ‘saved’ tickets; HIMB monitors ticket 
turnover and adjusts caps as necessary.  
Payment voucher – 
rights and duties 
Tickets provide information on GWEs, actual delivery and 
payment – a summary of entitlement and payment obligation.  
Table 3.2 Functions and uses of water tickets 
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In summary, water rights certificates would formalise the long-term water rights of WUAs 
within an ID. Water tickets would then ‘translate’ these rights into real-time rights for 
WUAs, allowing them to purchase water within the cap for a specific period, and according 
to how much water has been purchased previously. Long-term and real-time water rights 
are then connected through water use planning, which converts long-term GWE into the 
real-time water cap and water use scheduling according to the planned water demand and 
the runoff forecast of the river. The relationship between water rights, water rights 
certificates and water tickets is shown in Figure 3.1. 
 
Fig. 3.1 Relationship between water rights certificates and water tickets 
3.2 Water use planning 
The objective of water use planning is to schedule water diversion, storage, delivery and use 
in an ID according to the requirements of farmers, available supply from the river and flow 
through the irrigation channel system. A water use plan is a guideline for the rational 
delivery and use of water within an ID, and can help improve irrigation efficiency and save 
water. In this section, it is proposed that the water use plan takes the GWEs discussed 
previously as a starting point, and then translates them into a real-time irrigation schedule 
for WUAs. WET (2007) propose that this occurs through a computer-based model that can 
balance demand and supply, guide allocation between WUAs and help manage rights in a 
quick and transparent manner. 
At the beginning of the year, the annual water use plan for the ID would be  prepared by 
the irrigation management agency, based on the annual water use plans submitted by 
each WUA (within capped limits), and submitted upwards through the irrigation agency 
to the higher level department for approval, such as the river basin management 
department. The river basin management department would then revise and approve the 
annual available water cap and the water scheduling of the ID, according to the water 
abstraction permit of the ID and the annual runoff forecast of the river. Afterwards, the 
irrigation district management agency would adjust the annual plan accordingly, and 
announce it to WUAs. 
Prior to each irrigation, a WUA would then prepare and submit a plan for that period to the 
irrigation management agency for approval. The agency would check the available water 
allowance for each WUA, accounting for previous purchases, use under cap and overall 
irrigation scheduling, and make any necessary revisions or suggestions.  Following ticket 
purchase, a final water use plan would be confirmed in accordance with sold ticket volumes 
and the scheduling needs of all WUAs. 
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The computer model would help managers prepare, modify, summarize and publish 
schedules, and could be interrogated quickly by all relevant stakeholders. The model would 
also help managers deal with the effects of runoff variation and hydrological uncertainty, 
including emergency planning in the event of floods or droughts. 
3.3 Water users associations 
A key element of irrigation reform is the promotion of WUAs as farmer run, participatory 
institutions that take the place of village leader-run water control organisations or 
government agencies, and take over management of water allocation and infrastructure 
management at a local level (Wang et al., 2006). Water User Associations are registered as 
legal entities under Chinese Company Law. 
In HID, a total of 43 WUAs have been established since 2000 under 3rd level canals in the 
gravity flow sections, with a further 40 planned for completion by the end of 2008.. The 
boundaries of WUAs are defined by areas irrigated by tertiary and fourth canals. As a result, 
WUA and village boundaries do not always match. HIMB works with WUAs on the 
development of Annual Water Allocation Plans and scheduling arrangements, and WUAs 
are obliged to purchase water tickets prior to each irrigation period. It is proposed that 
WUAs hold and democratically manage GWEs on behalf of farmers and, within capped 
limits, continue to develop scheduling plans for household members, collect water fees, 
purchase water tickets from the ID management agency and undertake maintenance work 
on the infrastructure within their command areas.     
The ability of WUAs in Hangjin (and elsewhere in China) to manage water rights effectively 
under capped GWEs depends on a number of different factors. WET (2007) identify four key 
pre-conditions, based on a survey of WUAs and farm households conducted in 2007.  
Firstly, GWEs-based accounting through water certificates would need to be carefully 
monitored and enforced. The allocation system in HID combines bulk volumetric charging 
to WUAs established on branch canals, with area-based charging for farmers. Under such a 
system, the irrigation district management agency supplies water to WUAs on a contractual 
basis; contracts have no (current) legal authorization, but do specify the rights and 
obligations of both the agency and WUAs. Such contracts, or agreements, provide a type of 
group water right, albeit one of limited security. In Hangjin, moreover, the delivery of water 
to WUAs is governed by service contracts between WUAs and HIMB. Field work in HID 
(WET, 2007) suggests that these arrangements provide a sound basis for clarifying rights 
and responsibilities around water delivery and payment, and for the monitoring and 
recording of delivery and payment. They are recommended for other irrigation districts 
embarking on quota-based rights reform.  
Secondly, infrastructure needs to be compatible with defined rights and local management 
capacity. Any discussion on water rights reform cannot be isolated from an understanding 
of the infrastructure that is available to deliver, monitor and record water flows. In Hangjin, 
and in most other IDs in China, irrigation systems have not been designed to deliver and 
record flows to individual farmers. In these circumstances, volumetric rights can only be 
defined, monitored and enforced down to the level of the WUA and, conceivably, to 
production teams managing tertiary canals. Hence in such systems it is proposed that 
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capped rights are allocated to WUAs through GWE-based certificates, recognising that 
farmer-level entitlements cannot (yet) be implemented.   
Thirdly, WUAs need well-specified management functions, authority and accountability. A 
key issue here is whether WUAs genuinely represent the interests of all farmers, and 
whether they have the capacity to resolve competing claims and disputes. In Hangjin and 
other IDs where WUAs have been established, the management functions and authority of 
WUAs are spelt out in a charter, or set of written rules. The ability of farmers to assert 
individual claims within the bulk GWE will therefore depend on whether WUAs act as 
genuine organs of democratic self-management, and whether elections required under their 
charter are held in an open, inclusive and fair way.  It is therefore suggested that the 
democratic management of WUAs is scrutinised closely by the ID management agency for a 
period of time after initial establishment. Periodic audits of WUA performance covering this 
and other tasks (e.g. financial book-keeping) are recommended.    
Finally, WUAs require adequate resources. A common assumption in irrigation turnover 
programmes is that WUAs are better (than government agencies) at undertaking water 
allocation, distribution and fee collection in a cost-effective way. However, new obligations 
may be a serious burden on WUAs if they have been formed without adequate attention to 
their ongoing support needs. A key question in Hangjin and other IDs, therefore, is whether 
pressure to reduce government outlays – a key factor driving management transfer - has 
extended to an unwillingness to provide sufficient resources for WUAs to retain elected staff 
and carry out management tasks effectively, particularly in relation to long term water 
allocation, technical backstopping and maintenance.  It is therefore recommended that 
WUAs are allowed to retain enough ticket revenue to cover the salary costs of their full-time 
staff, and to cover operation and maintenance tasks within the WUA command area. 
Resourcing issues could be similarly monitored through periodic audit. 
3.4 Water metering and monitoring systems 
Many existing monitoring systems in China are crude, and need to be upgraded to support 
the operation and management of a modern water rights system. In HID, for example, water 
levels are measured using simple gauges, and flows are measured with traditional flow 
meters. All measurements are done by hand, with staff having to monitor and regulate 
flows through over 20 gates to WUAs. In a large ID this creates a very heavy workload for 
staff and at times of peak water demand, there may be a shortage of manpower.   
Future pressure on IDs to release water for urban and industrial users may increase pressure 
for more accurate monitoring of allocations to WUAs. In this context, automated water 
monitoring systems may help solve current and future problems, saving labour and money 
and providing more accurate monitoring and regulation of increasingly scare water.  
Design and use criteria a monitoring system needs to meet are outlined below (WET 2007).  
• Automated monitoring and data transmission. Automated systems are more accurate 
and less-labour intensive than manual ones, eliminating the need for station staff to 
travel between and monitor individual sites.   
• Rapid calculation and easy access to data. Data calculation and analysis should be quick 
and accurate, and data interrogation should be simple and direct. At present, data 
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enquiries in HID can only be answered by sifting through large numbers of paper 
records.  
• Remote control and monitoring of main sluices. The irrigation management bureau 
should be able to operate sluices on the main and branch canals at least remotely, 
avoiding long distance travel for station staff and the need to spend many hours at 
individual sites.   
• Transparency. It is important that an automated system retains the transparency of the 
existing system. In particular, WUA managers and farmers should have easy access to 
information on water deliveries to WUAs to build confidence in the quota-based 
certificate and ticketing arrangements.  
• Affordability. Any upgraded system needs to be affordable in terms of both capital 
costs, and the ongoing costs of repair and maintenance. Benefits can help off-set costs, 
however, and are likely to include time (labour) savings for irrigation management 
agency, and water security-income gains for farmers (through more timely and reliable 
water delivery).  
• Durability and security. An upgraded system must be able to cope with the sediment-
laden inflows of the river, and not require constant adjustment and maintenance. It 
should also be equipped with alarms to increase security, and data security and virus 
protection should be included.   
• Ease of use. Advanced systems must be capable of being operated and maintained by 
station staff.  
3.5 An integrated framework for rights management in irrigation districts 
Drawing on the discussion above, a broad water rights framework is proposed for HID and 
other IDs in China. The framework consists of three elements: institutions, irrigation 
services and regulations. These are described briefly below and illustrated in Figure 3.2. 
The institutional component refers to the management institutions responsible for water 
allocation and delivery, including the relevant river basin management departments, ID 
management agencies and WUAs.  The government river basin management department is 
responsible for allocating water and issuing water permits to IDs, and auditing their water 
use plans. No changes to existing allocation arrangements and responsibilities are proposed 
here. 
Irrigation management agencies are mainly responsible for water allocation to WUAs. In 
this paper, it is proposed that they assume responsibility for the granting and overall 
management of water rights certificates and water tickets issued to WUAs, in addition to 
existing responsibilities for collecting water fees, preparing the water use plan of the 
irrigation district, and monitoring water deliveries to WUAs. Water User Associations, in 
turn, would assume responsibility for purchasing water tickets within the caps set by GWE 
calculations, and would manage and monitor allocations under the cap to individual 
farmers. Field investigations in Hangjin suggest that, where ticket-based payment and 
contracting systems are already established, the capped arrangements for allocating and 
purchasing water proposed in this section could be implemented fairly easily.   
Irrigation services include the initial allocation of water rights, the issue of water certificates 
and tickets, water use planning, water delivery and operation of infrastructure. The 
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permitted water abstraction volume of the whole irrigation district is allocated to WUAs 
through the initial water rights allocation process described, forming the basis for granting 
water rights certificates and the sale of water tickets. WUAs would purchase tickets within 
their allocated rights, prepare a water use plan and submit it to the irrigation district 
management agency for approval. The irrigation district management agency would then 
complete a water use plan for the whole district and issue delivery instructions to sluice 
operators, according to each WUAs water use plan and remaining ticket purchase 
allowance. Deliveries would be monitored and signed-off as they are now, with agency staff 
and WUA managers entering into seasonal contracts, and jointly monitoring and confirming 
allocations. The irrigation district management agency would record each WUAs available 
water, purchased water, and supplied water every year and every watering in their water 
rights certificates on a continual basis, in order to check the water account and guide water 
supply in the next period. 
 
Fig. 3.2 A framework for water rights in an irrigation district 
Regulations would then ensure effective implementation and monitoring of the services 
above, and would need to cover management regulations for the issue and use of water 
rights certificates and water tickets, water fee collection, water delivery and water 
monitoring. All management regulations and systems need to be carefully coordinated. 
3.6 Recommendations 
Based on field investigations in HID, a water rights framework for IDs in China has been 
proposed in this section, based on an initial water rights allocation, the issue of water rights 
certificates, sale of water tickets, water use planning and effective management of farmer-
level rights through WUAs. Drawing on this framework, the authors offer the following 
recommendations:  
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1. Group Water Entitlements should be defined and allocated to WUAs in HID and other 
IDs, and could additionally be given legal basis by government so that rights can be 
legally asserted and defended, providing greater security to WUAs and farmers. In 
addition, a water rights management system should be developed for all IDs, including 
regulations that cover water use planning, water delivery, emergency planning and risk 
management, the collection of water fees and maintenance of infrastructure. 
Entitlement-based allocation planning underpins future water conservation efforts and 
the development of a modern, socialist countryside of China.  
2. The use of an allocation plan to allocate water to WUAs in HID and other IDs is 
feasible. The annual allocation process in an ID needs to define and allocate GWEs 
within the overall permitted allowance of the district, determined by the relevant river 
basin authority. Allocation planning of this kind is fairer and more transparent than 
existing arrangements.   
3. Existing contract and ticketing procedures operating between HIMB and WUAs are 
well understood and respected. They provide an excellent platform for the introduction 
of GWEs and ticket-linked water certificates. Those WUAs that have set up systems of 
continuous water accounting between irrigations, and volumetric delivery to (and 
billing of) individual production teams, will be better able to meet new quota 
obligations in a fair and transparent manner. Such systems are recommended for other 
IDs in China embarking on rights-based reform.  
4. Water trading to downstream industrial users has reduced the revenue available to 
HIMB. The issue of funding will need to be addressed to ensure the long-term 
sustainability of the trading programme and channel infrastructure, and to protect 
farmers’ long-term water rights. Management and institutional reforms in the ID 
should be conducted as soon as possible to improve management of the channels, 
enhance the financial position of the irrigation agency and secure new investment and 
financial resources. Most importantly, funding for the maintenance of newly lined 
channels in Hangjin should be secured from industrial enterprises as soon as possible. 
Similar channel lining and water transfer initiatives being considered by government 
agencies for other IDs in China need to learn from the experience of Hangjin.    
5. Information and monitoring systems in Hangjin and other IDs need to be gradually 
upgraded to improve accuracy and reliability and reduce manpower requirements. A 
key priority is to strengthen monitoring of water deliveries at WUA purchase points, as 
monitoring here affects both WUA payment and compliance with any new system of 
GWE-based water rights certificates. 
4. Water trading among the irrigation districts under a duration-based water 
rights system 
This section introduces a duration-based water allocation system, which has already existed 
for over 200 years in northwestern China, and discusses a water trading approach in the 
manners of exchanging the durations (the number of days) for water extraction. As case 
study in Taolai irrigation district, Gansu Province, China, the efficiency of the inner-
agriculture water trading in the duration-based water allocation system is reviewed. This 
kind of water trading would provide possible approaches to promote water trading in 
Chinese irrigation district. 
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4.1 Introduction 
Water resources support critical functions within human societies and ecosystems. Along 
with rapidly increasing population and improved living conditions, urbanization and 
industrial growth have led to increased demand, competition and conflicts between 
different water-use sectors (Liu et al., 2009). Climate change will intensify the situation in 
many parts of the world. It is very important to develop solution strategies to prepare 
against future conflicts.  
The water rights system has been proved an effective tool for water resources management 
(Wang, 2009; Brook and Harris, 2008). Generally, water rights are defined in volumetric 
terms, with a statement of the probability that the nominal volume will be delivered in full 
in any given year (Productivity Commission, 2003). The predictability is a key requirement 
of a water rights system, so that users can have a reasonable expectation of the volume of 
water that will be available to them (Speed, 2009). In Australia, the water management 
authority announces an available percentage of the water rights volume to each stakeholder 
seasonally according to current reservoir level and inflows over the forthcoming season 
(Rebgetz et al, 2009). The announcement of the available water should be transparent and 
least variable to the stakeholders during the year, who thus take the minimum hydrological 
risk when using water. In the contrary, the water authority takes most of the responsibility 
for guaranteeing the water rights, which increases its management and technical cost. How 
to reduce the hydrological risk and to share it between the water manager and users in 
water allocation is still an ongoing issue, which raised a lot of studies recently both in the 
developed (Robertson, 2009; Zaman et al, 2009) and developing countries (Wang and Wei., 
2006; Zhao et al., 2006; Hu and Tang, 2006; Zheng et al, 2010).  
Some useful techniques and methods were proposed in these studies, including the long-
term runoff predication, seasonal water allocation, self-adaptive water operation and so on. 
While all these techniques were developed to provide more reliable water volume 
availability under a centralized storage management, due to the hydrological uncertainties 
and storage capacity constraints, the hydrological risk affecting the volumetric water 
delivery cannot be completely removed only through these techniques. Moreover in 
practice, it is unlikely that dam managers will have complete information on user’s water 
demand preferences. With this asymmetric information, a central manager may implement a 
sub-optimal release (allocation) policy, raising a problem that the intra-seasonal allocation is 
overly conservative, that is, where early season allocations are low and there is unallocated 
water available in storage (Hughes, 2009).  
Institutional innovation such as redefining water entitlements rather than a share of total 
volume releases (natural stream runoff) is required. A system of allocating property rights to 
water from shared storages (as well as a share of inflows and losses), which is called 
capacity sharing, is established in Australia (Dudley and Musgrave 1988, Hughes, 2009). The 
capacity sharing proposed a decentralize the process allowing individual irrigators to 
exercise a degree of control over storage decisions and resulted in water entitlements more 
closely reflecting the physical realities of the water supply system: constrained storage 
capacity, variable water inflows and significant storage and delivery losses, and thus 
provided a solution to address the problems outlined above including hydrological risk and 
asymmetric information. 
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Similar with the capacity sharing, a Chinese traditional water entitlement may provide 
another way for solution. China has a long history of water resources development and 
management. Water diversions for irrigation dated as far back as 316 BC (Wouters et al., 
2004). In 18th Century, the administrative water allocation appeared in some arid rivers 
northwest China by defining the order and length of water extraction period between 
upstream and downstream users. This kind of water allocation has been widely adopted in 
the northwest China for hundred years and is still used currently. This traditional water 
entitlement, instead of sharing the water extraction volume, allocated water rights based on 
water extraction duration. Each entitlement holder in the river basin is allocated a share of 
the total number of water extraction days. This water rights arrangement is named 
“duration-based water rights” in this paper. 
The “duration-based water rights” is defined as a kind of water usufruct which is quantified 
by the independent duration of water extraction.  In “duration-based water rights” system, 
the water users can store or withdraw the entire natural stream within their permitted 
extraction period, and manage it independently: determining how much water to use (or 
sell) and how much to leave in the water course, meanwhile taking all risks from the 
hydrological uncertainty and variation by themselves. The dam manager does not need to 
make volumetric allocation announcements and their role becomes in charge of water 
accounting: recording each user’s inflows and withdrawals to monitor the quantity of water 
in each user’s account. However, due to lack of volumetric cap in water use, the surface 
stream would be likely used out and the ground water would be over extracted in the 
“duration-base water rights” system. 
4.2 Taolai River Basin 
Taolai River Basin is an inland watershed located in northwest of China, covers an area of 
28,100 km2. The total renewable water resources of the basin are estimated at 1.21 billion 
m3.  It has three main water users: Jiuquan Iron & Steel Corporation (JQI&SC), Taolai 
Irrigation District (Taolai ID) and Yuanyang Irrigation District (Yuanyang ID) (Figures 4.1 
and 4.2). The “duration-based water rights” started in Qing Dynasty about 200 years ago 
and is still used in this Basin. The stakeholders share the annual water extraction days (365 
days in total) in the mainstream of Taolai River: 37 days of water use duration for upstream 
JQI&SC; 153 days for Taolai ID, and 175 days for downstream Yuanyang ID. These days 
named as “allocation durations” in this paper are shown as the horizontal length of the 
slices in Figure 4.3. The users are able to store or use the entire natural stream during their 
water allocation periods independently, as shown in the right vertical ordinate of Figure 4.3. 
However, due to lack of volumetric cap in water use in this “duration-based water rights” 
system, the water resources development ratio in Taolai River Basin is rising and close to 
100% recently. An urgent institutional innovation is needed.  
4.3 A water allocation-trading framework for duration-based water rights system 
An improved “duration-based water rights” system is proposed by (1) introducing the 
volumetric water use cap in each allocation period, according to the water demand and 
historical water usage of the users; (2) creating the enabling environment for water trading; 
(3) promoting the water trading in the valley and (4) setting up an integrated water 
allocation-trading framework support these improvements (1), (2) and (3).  
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Note: Data from the National Fundamental Geographic Information System, China.  
Fig. 4.1 Location of the Taolai River Basin, Gansu province, China 
 
Fig. 4.2 Schematic diagram of Taolai River Basin, Gansu province, China 
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Fig. 4.3 Intra-year allocations of the “duration-based water rights” in Taolai River Basin, 
China 
1. Introducing the volumetric water use cap 
The discharge volume within a specific allocation period provides the maximum available 
water for the user who is authorized to withdraw water in that period under the “duration-
based water rights”, which is shown in Figure 4.4. The shaded area under the flow curve 
indicates the available water volume for Yuanyang ID in its first allocation period of the 
year. The annual available water can be identified by accumulating all the available water in 
the allocation periods across the year.  
The annual available water and historical water use of Taolai and Yuanyan ID under their 
“duration-based water rights” are shown in Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6. The water volume is 
ranked descendingly by the total annual runoff of the Taolai River 1980-2008, and plotted 
versus the hydrology frequency of the years. The year with hydrology frequency of n% 
means that the annual runoff of the year will be exceeded in n years out of 100. The annual 
available water of the IDs is the accessible water within their allocation periods so that is 
part of the total annual runoff; therefore, the available water in a dry year may be larger 
than that in a wetter year for the inter-annual variability of the runoff process, which can be 
found in Figure 4.5 and 4.6.  
In Figure 4.5, the historical water use of Taolai ID is stable and less than its available water, 
which indicates that there is some water didn’t or can’t be used by Taolai ID in its 
“duration-base water rights”. Actually, this unused water is mainly made up of the flood in 
July and August, which can hardly be stored by Taolai ID without enough reservoirs in it, 
and was spill out to the ecosystem and downstream Yuanyang ID. For the ecological benefit 
from the flood water, involving the stream flow maintenance and groundwater recharge, 
the annual water use limit is introduced underneath the available water of Taolai ID and 
portrayed by the upper cap line of historical water use for satisfying the current water 
demand.  
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Fig. 4.4 Water available volume in the allocation periods of Taolai River Basin 
 
 
 
 
Note: Source from Zheng, 2011.  
Fig. 4.5 Annual available water and water use limit for laolai ID 
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Note: Note: Source from Zheng, 2011. .  
Fig. 4.6 Annual available water and water use limit for Yuangyang ID 
In the downstream, Yuanyang ID stored and used part of the flood which was spilled by 
Taolai ID in its allocation periods, by a large reservoir in it. Therefore, the water used by 
Yuangyang ID was more than the water available in its allocation periods during 1980-2008. 
Water use limit of Yuanyang ID is established as the lower cap of its annual available water 
so that the Yuanyang ID’s water extract can follow its “duration-based water rights” strictly 
and all the flood water can be released for ecosystem, as shown in Figure 4.6.  
2. Water use plan and information exchange for water shortage 
The objective of water use planning is to schedule water diversion, storage, delivery and use 
in an ID according to the requirements of farmers, available supply from the river, and flow 
through the irrigation channel system. A water use plan is a guideline for the rational 
delivery and use of water within an ID, and can help improve irrigation efficiency and save 
water (Zheng and et al, 2009). It is proposed that the water use plan takes the water use 
limits discussed previously as a starting point, and then translates them into a periodical 
irrigation schedule for water users associations (WUAs) or farmers.  
Prior to each irrigation (or allocation period), the period water use plan for the ID would be 
prepared by the Irrigation Management Agency, based on the plan submitted by each 
WUA, and submitted upwards through the irrigation agency to the higher-level department 
for approval, such as the River Basin Management Department, who would then revise and 
approve the water scheduling of the ID, in term of the water use limit of the ID. Afterwards, 
the Irrigation District Management Agency would adjust the plan accordingly, and 
announce it to WUAs and farmers.  
If the irrigation water demand is not fully satisfied in the approved plan, on the agreement 
of the farmers, the Irrigation District Management Agency would release its water shortage 
information to the valley and search for the water sellers to promote a water trading. This 
process is proposed to occur through an on-line information exchange system that can 
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balance demand and supply, guide pricing and help manage water trading in a quick and 
transparent manner, such as the “watermove” system in Australia (Available at 
https://www.watermove.com.au/Default.aspx).   
3. Water trading 
The predictability and transferability can be satisfied more strongly in the “duration-based 
water rights” system due to the stable water allocation periods and the decentralized 
management of the runoff within them. The economic efficiency of the water trading is 
described from Equation 4.1 to 4.4.  
 
0
aD
a aW Q dt= ⋅  (4.1) 
 
0
jD
j jW Q dt= ⋅  (4.2) 
 a jMU MU  (4.3) 
where, Wa and Wj describe the exchanged water volume in April and July between Taolai 
and Yuanyang IDs (m3); Qa and Qj are mean stream flow in the two months (m3/s); Da and 
Dj are the number of exchanged days. MUa and MUj indicate the marginal utility of the 
water in April and July. From Figure 4.4, it is shown that Qa< Qj and Da= Dj. Therefore, Wa< 
Wj which indicates Taolai ID obtained less water from Yuanyang ID in spring and gave 
more water back in summer. Due to the serious runoff insufficiency and irrigation 
competition in spring, the water is more valuable then, as shown in Equation 4.3. So, there is 
a possibility that the benefit gained by Taolai ID from the allocation period exchange in 
spring can be equal to its benefit loss in summer. If this balance happens (Equation 4.4), the 
water trading will be efficient.   
 a a j jMU W MU W⋅ = ⋅  (4.4) 
In practice, water trading in the manner of exchanging water extraction days between 
upstream and downstream users has existed in the Taolai River Basin for years. This kind of 
water trading has being carried out in Taolai River Basin for yeas (totally 10 times, 2005-
2009) and reallocated water effectively, with no need of seasonal water allocation,  lower 
transaction cost and thus higher accessibility. In 2008, to solve the upstream water shortage 
caused by the mismatch between the irrigation schedule and allocation period distribution, 
the allocation period of Taolai ID was extended in April for 9 days, with the equivalent 
number of days reduction for Yuanyang ID simultaneously; while in summer when there is 
excess water for Taolai ID, the allocation period changed in the opposite directions as the 
same amount of days as in spring, shown in Figure 4.7.  
4. Towards an integrated framework for water allocation-trading in the system 
Drawing on the discussion above, broad water rights framework, combining the volumetric 
water use cap and the “time-based water rights”, is proposed. The framework consists of 
three elements: institutions, water allocation-trading services and regulations. These are 
described briefly below and illustrated in Figure 4.8.  
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Fig. 4.7 Allocation period exchanges between Taolai ID and Yuanyang ID in 2008 
The institutional component refers to the management institutions responsible for water 
allocation, trading and delivery, including the relevant State Water Resources Management 
Department, River Basin Management Authority, Irrigation District Management Agency 
and WUAs. The Water Resources Management Department of state government takes 
charge of administrative management for River Basin Management Authority. The authority 
is then responsible for allocating water and issuing water trading permits to IDs, and 
auditing their water use plans. Irrigation Management Agencies are mainly responsible for 
water allocation to WUAs and organizing a democratic decision making process for water 
trading. In this paper, it is proposed that they assume responsibility for preparing the water 
use plan of the irrigation district, and monitoring water deliveries to WUA. Water User 
Associations, in turn, would manage and monitor allocations under the cap to individual 
farmers. 
Water allocation-trading services include issue the available water and water use limit, 
water use planning, water delivery and operation of infrastructure, as well as the 
information support, application approval, contrast and publicity for water trading. Prior 
the irrigation, the available water volume and water use limit for current allocation period 
would be issued to the irrigation district according to the duration of its allocation period 
and the forecasted runoff. Then, the rationing water volume of the whole irrigation district 
is allocated to WUAs through the normal volumetric water allocation process, providing the 
cap for water use planning of the WUAs. The Irrigation District Management Agency would 
then complete a water use plan of the whole district accordingly and check whether there 
are water shortage and the necessity for buying water. After the democratic consultation 
with farmers, if the irrigation district decides to buy some water and extend its allocation 
period, the management agency would publish its requirement to other irrigation districts 
and seek the water seller. If the buyer and seller get an agreement on water trading, they 
would submit a trading application to the River Basin Management Authority for approval. 
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The water trading will be legally effective only after the trading application is approved by 
the government and passed through by publics.  
Regulations would then ensure effective implementation and monitoring of the services 
above, and would need to cover management regulations for the issue and use of 
volumetric water use cap together with the “duration-base water rights”, and the 
information exchange, decision making, third-party impacts assessment and approval for 
water trading, as well as water delivery and water monitoring. All management regulations 
and systems need to be carefully coordinated. 
 
Fig. 4.8 Water allocation-trading frameworks for duration-based water rights system 
4.4 Recommendations 
A water allocation-trading framework based on the “duration-based water rights” was 
proposed in this section. Comparing with the normal volumetric water rights system, the 
framework is supposed to reduce the management cost of the water authority by 
introducing a decentralised and semi-independent water management to the stakeholders. 
In the framework, water entitlement is indicated by the fixed amount of water extraction 
days and would hardly be affected by the hydrological uncertain. The water users can 
manage the stream flow and storage independently during their allocation period under the 
volumetric water use cap. The water authority is just responsible for the water use planning 
and accounting, making sure the water use of the stakeholders not over their limit. The 
hydrological risk is shared mostly by water users while they get more flexibility to make 
their own storage decisions, taking into account their private information on water needs.  
The idea of “duration-based water rights” is similar with the capacity sharing in Australia to a 
certain extent. Capacity sharing is a system of allocating property rights to water from shared 
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storages proposed by Dudley (Dudley and Musgrave 1988, Dudley and Alaouze 1989, Dudley 
1990, Dudley 1992). Each entitlement holder in an irrigation system is allocated a share of the 
total system storage capacity, as well as a share of total inflows (spill water and losses). Users 
are able to manage these capacity shares independently, as well as take the hydrological risk 
and losses. The duration-based water allocation-trading framework suggests a property rights 
system by sharing the water extraction duration, rather than storage capacity. But both of the 
systems suggest a decentralize the process by designing some system of property rights 
allowing individual irrigators to exercise a degree of control over storage decisions, which is 
helpful to address some of the problems of centralized water management, such as the 
hydrological risk, asymmetric information and transaction costs in water delivering. The 
proposed duration-base water allocation framework could provide a comparison reference for 
capacity sharing, and the success of the capacity sharing practice in Australia could be helpful 
to understand the feasibility and practicability of the proposed framework. 
Volumetric water use limit was introduced and combined with duration-based water 
allocation in the study, which suggested a mechanism to integrate the international 
contemporary water rights system with the Chinese traditional water management. In 
recent decades, with the introduction of the global experiences of water rights reform, 
volumetric water right and its allocation system have been implemented across the China to 
a varying degree (Gao, 2006; Shen & Speed, 2009), and replaced the traditional water 
allocation system in most of the rivers. This  has raised many conflicts in the reforms. The 
integrated mechanism proposed in this chapter would be helpful to buffer the conflicts 
when establishing a volumetric water rights system in valleys where the traditional water 
allocation is still working. Moreover, the integrated water allocation-trading framework 
could be used in the upcoming process of establishing the water market in Taolai River 
Basin, which would probably become the first water market in China and also a significant 
improvement in China’s water rights reform. The framework would be feasible for the arid 
river, especially the valley which has uneven spatial distribution of the storage capacity.  
For the limitation of the data and practices, the proposed framework just provides a 
conceptual framework of integrating the volumetric and time-based water rights without 
enough data verification. As noted, to transform this result based on one case study into the 
business of managing water catchments on a daily basis requires considerable further 
research, policy development and investment. Some future researches are still required to 
improve the framework, involving (1) defining the volumetric ground water cap in Taolai 
valley; (2) pilot study to verify the feasibility and validity of the framework; (3) modelling 
the irrigation water use planning which is constrained by the volumetric cap and time-based 
allocation in the irrigation districts and farmers level; (4) the technique for monitoring and 
accounting the water use and trading volume.  
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